Nate’s Notes

Since this is the last issue for June, Signals is replaced by SigInt, a feature that takes the issues discussed throughout the month and synthesizes them in context.

Once a month I set the new headlines aside and look back at the ones we already ran, to name the thread underneath them.

Let me know what you think.

Main Article

Cold storage is a hot issue

In 2013, when I was a dispatcher at Burlington County Central Communications, a massive cold storage facility caught fire in Delanco, NJ. The Dietz & Watson facility was five stories of cold storage; three hundred thousand square feet of meat and cheese, and a roof covered in seven thousand solar panels the company had put up three years earlier to cut its energy bill.

The crews couldn't get on the roof. You can't switch a solar array off in daylight, so the whole roof stayed live. That week Bloomberg ran a story about us called "Why Firefighters Fear Solar Power," and the Delanco fire chief, Ron Holt, told them why in one sentence. "With all that power and energy up there, I can't jeopardize a guy's life for that." The roof came down within hours.

I hadn't thought about Delanco in years until a couple of weeks ago, watching a freezer warehouse in Boyle Heights burn on the news.

A cold storage building run by a company called Lineage caught fire on June 17th and burned for a week before Los Angeles called it knocked down. Knocked down, not out. On a fire like this those are very different words, and the gap between them runs into weeks while crews chase hot spots buried deep in the insulation where no water ever reached. And nobody in the fire service was surprised, because the same operator had already watched one of its own freezers in Finley, Washington burn for 60 straight days back in 2024. Two years apart, two buildings, one company. I wasn't surprised either, and I've been off the dispatch floor for years.

So let me tell you why a cold storage fire behaves nothing like the warehouse fire you're picturing, because I had to learn it the hard way and the lesson hasn't changed.

A freezer is built to stop energy from moving. Thick foam insulation, combustible, sandwiched inside metal panels and sealed tight so the cold stays in. That same design is what makes it nearly unkillable once it lights. The fire works into the foam behind the metal skin, and the skin that keeps the product cold keeps the water out. Crews can soak the outside of a panel all night and never touch the fire living inside it. Then there's the refrigerant, which in a lot of these plants is anhydrous ammonia, great for cooling and a real problem to breathe the second it gets loose. Add tens of millions of pounds of plastic-wrapped food, which is just fuel sitting in a cold room. Put it together and the honest call from the fire service is days and weeks, not hours, and the only smart play is to go defensive, give up on the building, and keep the fire from taking anything else with it.

Now put a solar roof on top of all that, which is the part I watched break our incident in Delanco. An energized array is a roof you can't cut to ventilate and can't safely stand on, and it stays dangerous long after the flames are down. In Delanco the shock risk from those panels held up the cleanup for weeks. We keep bolting power generation onto the tops of these boxes and never quite price what it costs us on the day the box catches fire.

None of this is secret knowledge. It's documented, it's old, and this time it happened to a company that had already lived through the 60-day version. Now we get into legal territory: foreseeability. It's the word a plaintiff's lawyer reaches for and the word an underwriter reads a policy through. When a hazard is this well understood with this much precedent, the question after the fire is never just what happened, it's what you knew and what your plan assumed. A cold storage operator in 2026 whose emergency plan counts on the fire department saving the building is going to lose the building anyway, and then lose the case, because the fire service told everybody years ago that they can't save it.

A real plan starts from the other end. It assumes you lose the building and everything in it. It assumes the fire runs for weeks. It assumes the product has to go somewhere or get written off, that your customers' cold chain obligations don't pause because your roof is on fire, and that the ruined inventory turns into a public health problem the minute the coolers go dark. The 85 million pounds of food in Boyle Heights didn't disappear with the flames, it rotted in place, next to people's houses, and drew exactly what you'd expect. From my own experience with Delanco, it smelled great for about two days and then awful for two months.

And the problem doesn't stop at your fence line. When they finally put the Washington fire out, testing on the water used to fight it came back loaded with heavy metals and PFAS, the forever chemicals everybody's suing over right now, above state limits. That water goes into the soil and the storm drains and whatever sits downhill, and the bill for it lands on the site, not the firefighters. The people across the street are inside your incident for weeks, and more than a hundred of the Washington neighbors went on to sue.

Here's what actually bothers me, and it isn't the fire. Nothing in the math is telling anyone to prevent the next one. The building belonged to one company, the operator to another, the solar to a third, and according to the reporting the operator came out of its 60-day disaster with a net gain once the insurance paid, cleanup and all. I argued in Issue 01 that the insurance carrier has more say over physical security than any law or association does. This fire is that argument proven. When the people carrying the risk can be made whole or better while the cost lands on the neighbors and the next town, the system isn't broken, it's just reactionary.

So the plan is the product, same as it always is. You can't out-equipment this one, because the suppression is going to fail, and that's the documented baseline, not the worst case. What protects the company and the neighborhood is everything you settled before the alarm: where the product goes; how you contain the fire water; who answers to the people across the street; what you already put in writing about a risk the whole industry had watched play out start to finish.

So when the smoke finally clears, one question is left, and the insurer and the plaintiff's lawyer will both get to it. It won't be whether the fire could happen. Everybody in the business knows it can, and the warnings have been on the record for years. The question will be what your plan did about it. You want that answer written down before the alarm, because nobody believes the version you come up with after.

Touring

The power of “hello”

When I toured the security operation at Universal Orlando, I asked what their officers actually do out in the parks all day. One of the first answers was that they say hello. To a guest it reads as hospitality, but that's not why they do it. A greeting is one of the cheapest reads on intent they've got, and you can borrow it for nothing.

Retail calls it the ten-foot rule: tell every officer to make eye contact and say a word to anyone who comes within ten feet. On a security post it does a second job. Somebody casing the place came in to be invisible, and a guard who looks him in the eye and says good morning just took that away. A person planning something tends to handle being greeted differently than someone having a rough day, but that's a place to look twice, not a verdict. A cold response can be a bad morning, an illness, a language barrier, or nothing at all, and an officer who treats it as proof is a liability, not an asset.

Most posts skip the hello because the officer's eyes are on a phone or a monitor instead of the floor, and you can't greet what you aren't watching. Fix that and you get paid back two ways. The stranger who decides not to test a building where the guard looked right at him, and the regulars who start telling you what they notice, because people who get greeted talk. Spot-check how often your posts actually do it, and make sure that when a visitor mentions something, it lands in the report instead of in the air.

A hello costs nothing, which makes it the rare security investment with infinite ROI.

Signals

How much control do you have?

Once a month, SigInt sets the new headlines aside and goes back through the Signals notes you already read, to name what they had in common that none of them showed on its own. Here's what ran across June's three issues.

  • A hospital fine. Cal/OSHA fined a San Francisco hospital after a workplace homicide it had been warned about for years and never fixed.

  • The World Cup. The biggest security operation this country has ever run opened, five weeks of committed details and mutual aid that's thinner on the ground than the org chart says.

  • Counter-drone enforcement. Over the tournament, the FBI was pulling down a drone about every ten minutes during one match, while private operators learned they can watch a drone but never legally touch it.

A stabbing, a stadium, and a drone don't look like they belong in the same sentence. Two of the three were even the same event from different angles, the crowd and the airspace, while the third happened three thousand miles away on a hospital floor. So the thread that ties them isn't the World Cup, it's a question, and that question was never whether a bad thing can happen, it was what you knew ahead of time and whether you can prove what you did about it.

The hospital wasn't fined for the killing, it was fined for a warning that went nowhere, a workplace-violence citation back in 2020 and staff who raised the problem and got waved off. The regulator didn't ask whether the attack could have been stopped, it asked whether the risk was foreseeable and whether the response was on the record. The World Cup note is the same question one step earlier, because how your district's mutual aid actually holds up on a match day is an answer you want in your hand in June, not one you go hunting for in the middle of an incident in July. And even the drone note lands in the same place, since you can't bring the aircraft down and the only move the law leaves you is to log every sighting, which is what eventually pays for the system you're not allowed to buy yet.

What changes from one note to the next is how much control you actually have. At the hospital it was all yours, and the failure was sitting on what you already knew. At the World Cup you can't add officers to a regional surge, but you can map where your own coverage goes thin before it costs you. With the drone, federal law takes the response away from you completely and leaves you a logbook. By the third note your control is almost gone, but the obligation never moves an inch, because you still have to see the risk coming and write down what you did about it.

Accountability has moved upstream of the incident. Your regulator, your insurer, and your own leadership are all closing in on the same question, and it isn't whether something happened on your watch, it's whether you saw it coming and what your record shows you did about it. A program that can answer that survives a bad night, and the one that can't is exposed even after a quiet one.

So before the next quarter gets going, take one risk you've already been warned about and close the loop on it in writing. Not the exotic one, but the one already sitting in your incident reports and your inbox.

Passdown

dictated by Ricky Portezzo, Senior Security Supervisor in Center City, Philadelphia

Shift report for Monday.

We're doing the say hello to everybody thing now, Mikey's orders, so I'm doing it. Two of them stuck with me tonight.

First guy, hood up, pacing by the side door, the type you keep one eye on. Old me stands at the desk and watches him. New me walks over and says how you doing, you need something. Poor guy was just lost, looking for the parking office. Walked him to the right door. Nice enough kid.

Little later, regular looking guy, could be anybody, strolling the lobby like a customer. I say "Evening, how are ya?" and he about jumps out of his skin. Looks at me, looks at the door, gets all flustered, and just leaves. Never said a word. I don't know what that was about and I'm not gonna sit here and make up a story, but whatever he came in to do, he ain't doing it here tonight.

So that's the hello thing. The guy who looked all wrong just needed directions. The one who looked like nobody at all is the one who ran out the door. Go figure. You don't get that off a camera.

Janitor waxed the floors tonight, so be careful. OK, I’m starving. Think on my way home I’ll stop at Wawa to get a hoa-

The eyes you train on the floor catch what the cameras miss. Give them a standard worth following. SCC Spectrum Security Almanacs. www.gsoc911.com/products

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